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Abstract 
Due to advance of global manufacturing, the decentralized optimization of multi-tier supply chains for multiple retailers and manufacturers 
becomes more and more important. Conventional works on game theoretical model for supply chain planning problems concentrates on single 
period models. However, the situations for decision making in decentralized supply chains are subject to change with respect to time periods. In 
this paper, we address the optimization of multi-period bilevel supply chains under demand uncertainty. The decentralized supply chain planning 
problem is modelled as a multi-period non-cooperative game. The problem is formulated as a stochastic multi-period bilevel optimization problem 
under demand uncertainty. The optimization algorithm to derive a Stackelberg equilibrium for multi-period bilevel supply chain planning problem 
is developed. The effectiveness of the proposed method is validated by comparing it with the single period models. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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2015. 
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1. Introduction 
With the progress of the global supply chain, members of 
the supply chain (SC) are widely spread to multiple companies 
in domestic or global countries. It is required to achieve the 
overall optimization of delivery as a whole SC from the 
procurement of orders, production and distribution. 
Conventionally, the SC optimization problems describe the 
entire SC as a single optimization problem and the 
methodology of obtaining solutions were common. However, 
in the global SC, considering the profit and contractual 
relationships among multiple companies, the establishment of 
the game theoretical approach is urgently needed in supply 
chain planning under uncertainties (Fig. 1).  
Most conventional studies on the game theoretical approach 
assume that the SC configuration, i.e., members of the SC, the 
leader or follower relationship, terms and conditions are fixed 
or they are treated as constraints. In this paper, the SC 
configuration represents the configuration of  product items, 
the contracted suppliers or retailers, leader or follower 
relationship, contract, trading conditions (rather than in the 
software components, not in the hardware part). In recent years, 
with the dismantling of the popular and business-to-business 
series of information systems. It has become to be able to select 
suppliers freely. In recent global SC, due to uncertainty and 
changes of new product development, changes in the trade and 
currency risk, uncertainties such as disaster risk, it is required 
to build reconfigurable SC that can flexibly respond to several 
changes minimizing the amount of resources as possible. 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Necessity of the game theoretical approach in supply 
chain planning under uncertainties 
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Dynamic supply chain is a flexible SC that can change the 
suppliers for each contract without specific trading partners 
only with respect to conventional SC with the fixed leader or 
follower relationship. In this paper, we study a reconfigurable 
bilevel supply chain under that can change the leader or 
follower relationship. The bilevel supply chain consists of the 
suppliers and retailers with a leader or follower relationship. 
The authors have proposed an optimization algorithm to 
derive the Stackelberg equilibrium solution for the bilevel SC 
that the supplier is a leader and the retailer is a follower. Zhang 
and Shi (2009) developed a multi-period production planning 
model [1]. Yoshida and Nishi (2014) presented a theoretical 
analysis of bilevel multi-period production planning problem 
[2]. Yoshida and Nishi (2015) presented an algorithmic 
procedure to derive a Stackelberg equilibrium for multi-period 
bilevel SC under demand uncertainty [3].  
However, the above model does not consider reconfigurable 
SC that the leader or follower of the member of the SC can be 
flexibly changed. Therefore, newly formulated multiperiod 
bilevel level SC problem under demand uncertainty is required. 
In this paper, an algorithm to obtain a decision making of 
reconfiguration of bilevel SC, which determines who should be 
a leader or a follower of the SC, is studied. Considering the 
demand uncertainty, the objective function of the retailer is 
formulated as a nonlinear function. For the solution of the 
bilevel programming problem, the main issues are only related 
to a single period planning problem. However, the solution 
algorithm with a nonlinear bilevel problems in multi-period 
planning problems has not been studied so far. Therefore, in 
this study, for the Stackelberg equilibrium by a single supplier 
and a single retailer, we propose an efficient solution algorithm 
for multi-period bilevel production planning problem that takes 
into account the demand uncertainty. 
2. Related works 
Coordination of production planning for multiple 
companies is proposed by Nishi et al. (2008) [4]. Game theory 
is a well-known approach to achieve the coordination. Yu et al. 
(2009) improves members’ profits of supply chain systems 
between a manufacturer and its retailers incorporating the 
inventory policy by a Stackelberg game where advertising, 
pricing and inventory replenishments are all involved [5]. The 
coordination of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and 
a retailer with return policy is proposed by Xiao et al. (2010) 
[6]. Yang et al. (2011) presents an assembly supply chain 
system consisting of one retailer and two suppliers with 
forecast updating [7]. Nagurney et al. (2005) have introduced a 
game theoretical approach for supernetworks in which supply-
side and demand-side risk are included [8][9]. They derive 
Nash equilibrium of the supernetworks. Yin and Nishi (2014) 
presented a solution procedure for a mixed integer nonlinear 
formulation of the supply chain optimization problem with 
quantity discounts under demand uncertainty [10]. Yin and 
Nishi (2015) developed an optimal coordination for suppliers 
and manufacturer by using a Stackelberg equilibrium under 
demand uncertainty [11]. Zhang and Shi presented a multi-
period multi-product newsvendor models with supplier 
discounts [1]. By utilizing the multi-period newsvendor model, 
Yoshida et al. (2014) investigated an analytical solution for 
multi-period production planning for single supplier and 
retailer under uncertain demands [2]. However, the analytical 
model does not always applied to the real problems. The 
problem to find the Stackelberg equilibrium can be formulated 
as a bilevel optimization problems [12]. Jiao and Tseng (2013) 
addressed a direct method to derive an equilibrium of bilevel 
optimization problems [13]. Du et al. (2014) introduces an 
interactive solution approach to solve the Stackelberg game 
theoretic model for joint optimization of the product family 
configuration and scaling design [14]. Yoshida and Nishi 
(2015) presented an algorithmic approach to solve the multi-
period bilevel supply chain consisting of single supplier and 
single retailer [3]. However, the multi-period SC 
reconfiguration problem which can change its leader or 
follower relationship has not been considered in the prior works. 
3. Multi-period dynamic supply chain 
3.1 Dynamic supply chain 
   Dynamic supply chain stated here is a reconfigurable supply 
chain that can change its contracted partners, cooperative or 
noncooperative relationship dynamically. In this paper we 
assume a multi-period bilevel supply chain that can change its 
leader and follower relationship dynamically with respect to 
time periods. 
 
3.2 Problem description 
In this study, we consider a single supplier and a single 
retailer of a multi-period bilevel production planning problem 
shown in Fig. 2. We assume that there is a leader or follower 
relationship between them in order to respond quickly with 
uncertain situations. In the model, the supplier determines its 
production quantity and inventories for multi-products in order 
to maximize the total expected profit under demand certainty. 
The retailer determines its distribution planning and the order 
quantity to the supplier under demand uncertainty when the 
wholesale price is given. The inventory balancing constraints 
should be satisfied for multi-period planning both for the 
supplier and the retailer. The timing of production, order 
quantity, inventory balancing are represented in Fig. 3. The 
demand of customers as normally distributed, make decisions 
to maximize the expected value of the own interests. As well 
as producers, inventory that occurred in a certain period shall 
be carried over to the next. Also, if the product shipments there 
period does not satisfy the demand of customers, it is assumed 
to bear a lost opportunity penalties. 
The decision-making for suppliers and retailers is done through 
multi-periods. It is assumed that to make decisions based on the 
Stackelberg game, in particular, the leader and the follower 
relationship can be changed according to the situations. Fig. 2 
shows the relationship between the supplier and the retailer. 

Fig. 2.  Two-tier supply chain with supplier and retailer. 
supplier retailer
order quantity
production quantity
demand
uncertainty
leader or follower leader or follower
product  delivery
510   Tatsushi Nishi and Okihiro Yoshida /  Procedia CIRP  41 ( 2016 )  508 – 513 
 
Fig. 3. Multi-period model. 
 
3.3 Problem formulation 

The multi-period supply chain planning problem with a single 
supplier and a single retailer under demand uncertainty is 
formulated as a bilevel programming problem. 
 
Sets: 
J: set of product items 
T: set of planning periods 
 
Parameters: 
ܿ௧௝: production cost for item j in period t 
݃௧௝: opportunity loss cost of item j in period t for retailer 
݄௧௝௦ : inventory holding cost of item j in period t for supplier 
݌௧௝: sales price of item j in period t 
ݏ௧௝: setup cost for item j in period t 
ݓ௧௝: wholesales price for item j period t 
ܯ: a sufficiently large constant 
݄௧௝௥ : inventory holding cost of item j in period t for retailer 
ݖ௧௝: random variable representing demand of item j in period t 
following normal distribution ܰሺߤ௝ǡ ߪ௝ଶሻ where ߤ௝ is the average 
of demand of item j and ߪ௝ଶ is the variance of demand of item j. 
 
Decision variables: 
 
Supplier 
௧ܱ௝: production quantity of item j in period t 
ܫ௧௝௦ : inventory quantity of item j in period t for supplier 
ݔ௧௝: binary variable that takes 1 if product item j is changed in 
period t, and 0 otherwise 
ݕ௧௝: binary variable that takes 1 if product item j is produced in 
period t, and 0 otherwise 
 
Retailer 
ܳ௧௝: order quantity of product item j in period t from retailer to 
supplier 
ܫ௧௝௥ : inventory quantity of item j in period t for retailer, 
௧ܵ௝ : delivery quantity of item j in period t from retailer to 
customers 
 
ܬ௦ ൌ σ σ ൫ݓ௧௝ܳ௧௝ െ ܿ௧௝ ௧ܱ௝ െ ݄௧௝ܫ௧௝௦ െ ݏ௧௝ݔ௧௝൯௃௝ୀଵ்௧ୀଵ )     (1) 
s. t.  ܫ௧௝௦ ൌ ܫ௧ିଵǡ௝௦ ൅ ௧ܱ௝ െ ܳ௧௝ǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                               (2) 
௧ܱ௝ ൒ ܳ௧௝ െ ܫ௧ିଵǡ௝௦ ǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                                                 (3) 
σ ݕ௧௝௃௝ୀଵ ൑ ͳǡ׊ݐ                                              (4) 
ݔ௧௝ ൒ ݕ௧௝ െ ݕ௧ିଵǡ௝ǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                                          (5) 
௧ܱ௝ ൑ ܯݕ௧௝ǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                   (6) 
௧ܱ௝ ǡ ܫ௧௝௦ ൒ Ͳǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                                          (7) 
ݔ௧௝ǡ ݕ௧௝ א ሼͲǡ ͳሽ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                                        (8) 
max ܬ௥ ൌ σ σ ܧሺܴܧ௧௝ െ ܫܥ௧௝ െ ܷ ௧ܲ௝ െ ݓ௧௝ܳ௧௝ሻ௃௝ୀଵ்௧ୀଵ   (9) 
s.t. ܫ௧௝௥ ൌ ܫ଴௝௥ ൅ σ ሾܳ௧ᇲ௝ െ ൫ݖ௧ᇲ௝ǡ ܵ௧ᇲ௝൯ሿ௧௧ᇲୀଵ ǡ ׊ݐǡ ׊݆ (10) 
ܴܧ௧௝ ൌ ݌௧௝ ൫ݖ௧௝ǡ ௧ܵ௝൯ǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                           (11) 
ܫܥ௧௝ ൌ ݄௧௝௥ ܫ௧௝௥ ǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                                    (12) 
ܷ ௧ܲ௝ ൌ ݃௧௝൫Ͳǡ ݖ௧௝ െ ௧ܵ௝൯ǡ ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                   (13) 
ܳ௧௝ ൅ ܫ௧ିଵǡ௝௥ െ ௧ܵ௝ ൒ Ͳǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                                (14) 
ܳ௧௝ െ ሺ ௧ܱ௝ ൅ ܫ௧௝௦ ሻ ൑ Ͳǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                                  (15) 
ܳ௧௝ǡ ௧ܵ௝ǡ ܫ௧௝௥ ൒ Ͳǡ׊ݐǡ ׊݆                              (16) 
 
In the supplier’s problem, decision variables are the 
production quantity ௧ܱ௝ of item j in period t and the inventory 
quantity of the products ܫ௧௝௦ . ݕ௧௝  is the binary variable which 
equals 1 if the supplier produces the product ݆ in period ݐ and 
0 otherwise. ݔ௧௝ is also the binary variable which equals to 1 if 
the supplier produces the different product in period ݐ  from 
period ݐ െ ͳ . The objective function (1) is the sum of the 
wholesale profit ݓ௧௝ܳ௧௝ , the production cost ܿ௧௝ ௧ܱ௝ , the 
inventory holding cost ݄௧௝௦ ܫ௧௝௦  and the setup cost ݏ௧௝ݔ௧௝ . The 
constraints (2) express the inventory balancing constraints and 
the constraints (3) denote the production quantity. The supplier 
can produce only one type of product by the constraints (4). 
Constraints (5) represent the setup constraints. ܯ  is a large 
positive constant in constraints (6). Constraints (7) and (8) 
denote variable constraints. On the other hand, in the retailer’s 
problem, the decision variables consist of the order quantity to 
the supplier ܳ௧௝, the delivery of the products for the customer 
ܵ௧௝  and the inventory quantity ܫ௧௝௥  of item j. The objective 
function (9) consists of the sales revenue ܴܧ௧௝ , inventory 
holding cost ܫܥ௧௝, the opportunity cost ܷ ௧ܲ௝  and the wholesale 
cost ݓ௧௝ܳ௧௝ . In the problem, the customers demand is assumed 
to be uncertain. Therefore, ܴܧ௧௝, ܫܥ௧௝ and ܷ ௧ܲ௝  are represented 
by the expected values by the equation (11), (12) and (13), 
respectively. The constraints (10) are the inventory balancing 
constraints. The constraint (14) describes the upper bound of 
the delivery for the customers. The constraint (15) describes the 
upper bound of the order quantity. The constraints (16) denote 
the non-negativity of decision variables. 
4. Solution approach 
4.1 Reformulation of the expectation function 
Section 3.3 shows the multi-period bilevel supply chain 
model. In the model, the retailer’s objective function is 
calculated as the expected value because of the demand 
uncertainty. However, it is difficult to solve the retailer’s 
problem by the experimental method if the customer’s demand 
is assumed to depend on normal distribution.  
Petkov and Maranas (1997) addressed the normalization 
technique of the expectation of the costs under demand 
uncertainty [15]. In their model, the retailer’s objective 
function is reformulated by the normalization of the probability 
distribution. Therefore, in this study, we propose the 
supplier
retailer
production
inventory
transferorder
customer
delivery
inventory
Time period
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reformulation of the retailer’s problem by the normalization. In 
this case, the expected value of the sales revenue ܴܧ௧௝ , 
inventory holding cost ܫܥ௧௝ and the opportunity loss cost ܷ ௧ܲ௝  
are reformulated as (17), (18), (19) respectively. 
 
ܴܧ௧௝ ൌ ݌௧௝ݖƸ௧௝ ൅ ݌௧௝ߪ௧௝ሾെ݂൫ ௧ܻ௝൯ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߔሺ ௧ܻ௝ሻሻ ௧ܻ௝ሿ         (17) 
ܫܥ௧௝ ൌ ݄௧௝௥ ሾܫ଴௝௥ ൅ ෍ ܳ௧ᇲ௝
௧
௧ᇲୀଵ
 
െσ ሾݖƸ௧ᇲ௝ ൅ ߪ௧ᇲ௝ሾെ݂൫ܻ௧ᇲ௝൯ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߔሺܻ௧ᇲ௝ሻሻܻ௧ᇲ௝௧௧ᇲୀଵ ሿሿሿ 
(18) 
ܷ ௧ܲ௝ ൌ െ݃௧௝ߪ௧௝ ቂെ݂൫ ௧ܻ௝൯ ൅ ቀͳ െ ߔ൫ ௧ܻ௝൯ቁ ௧ܻ௝ቃ         (19) 
In these equations, ݂ is the probability density function and ߔ 
is the cumulative distribution function. ݖƸ௧௝ is the average of the 
customer’s demand, ߪ௧௝ଶ  is the variance of the customer’s 
demand. Also, ௧ܻ௝ is defined by (20) and it is used in order to 
realize the normalization of the retailer’s objective function. 
 
௧ܻ௝ ൌ
ௌ೟ೕି௭Ƹ೟ೕ
ఙ೟ೕ
                                                                         (20) 
 
By using the equations (17), (18), (19) and (20), the retailer’s 
profit maximization problem is reformulated into the equations 
(9), (10), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), (19) and (20). The 
supplier’s decision problem is a mixed integer program and the 
retailer’ decision problem is a nonlinear programming problem 
(NLP) that can be solved by a general purpose solver. 
4.2 Solution algorithm for bilevel programming 
This section shows the solution algorithm for the multi-
period bilevel supply chain model which is formulated as the 
nonlinear bilevel programming problem. In the algorithm, the 
supplier’s problem is solved with the retailer’s fixed order 
quantity ܳ௧௝ , and the retailer’s problem is solved with the 
production quantity and the inventory quantity of ௧ܱ௝ ൅ ܫ௧௝௦ . By 
the iterative process, the Stackelberg equilibrium ܳ௧௝כ  is 
obtained. The retailer’s objective function is formulated as the 
nonlinear programming problem. Therefore, we use IPOPT, 
the solver of General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). 
The supplier’s problem is the mix-integer linear function. 
Therefore, we solve the supplier’s problem by the branch and 
bound method. 
The algorithm to solve the multi-period bilevel supply chain 
model is shown as follows. 
 
Step 1 Set the production quantity and the inventory quantity 
௧ܱ௝ ൅ ܫ௧௝௦ ՚ ͳሺ׊ݐǡ ׊݆ሻ, ݈ ՚ ͳ and ܬ௦୫ୟ୶ ՚ Ͳ. ݈  is the index 
of the equilibrium solution and ܬ௦୫ୟ୶  is the supplier’s the 
largest objective value. Go to Step 2.  
Step 2 Solve the retailer’s problem by using IPOPT with fixed 
production quantity and the inventory quantity of the 
products for the suppliers’ decision. The obtained solution is  
ܳ௧௝௟ ሺ׊ݐǡ ׊݆ሻ.  Go to Step 3. 
Step 3 Solve the supplier’s problem by the branch and bound 
method with the order quantity ܳ௧௝௟ , and the objective value 
is named as ܬ௦௟ . ܬ௦୫ୟ୶ ՚ ܬ௦௟  and ݈כ ՚ ݈  if ܬ௦௟ ൐ ܬ௦୫ୟ୶ . If the  
௧ܱ௝ ൅ ܫ௧௝௦  is not updated, equilibrium solution is  ܳ௧௝௟
כ
 and the 
algorithm is completed. Otherwise, ௧ܱ௝ ൅ ܫ௧௝௦ ՚ ௧ܱ௝ ൅ ܫ௧௝௦ ൅
ͳ and ݈ ՚ ݈ ൅ ͳ, and then go to Step 2. 
  Through the iterative process of the solution algorithm, the 
equilibrium solution is obtained in the bilevel programming 
problem. In this study, the supplier is the leader in Stackelberg 
game. Therefore, the supplier’s objective function is 
maximized in the equilibrium point. 
5. Computational experiments 
The multi-period bilevel supply chain model is analysed by 
some computational experiments and the model is verified in 
this section. In the model, the upper level is the supplier’s 
problem which is formulated as the mixed-integer linear 
programming problem (MILP). The lower level is the retailer’s 
problem which is formulated as the nonlinear programming 
problem (NLP). In the retailer’s problem, the customer’s 
demand is assumed to follow a normal distribution. The 
probability distribution is reformulated by the normalization in 
order to be computed by the solution algorithm shown in 
section 3. In the experiment, the end of period ܶ ൌ ͷ and the 
number of the product types ܬ ൌ ͵ . The experiment was 
performed by Intel (R) Core(TM) i7-2700 CPU 3.50GHz with 
General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS). Two kinds of 
solvers are used in the experiments. One is CPLEX used to 
solve MILP for the supplier. The other is the IPOPT used to 
solve the retailer’s NLP. In the experiment, ߤ௧௝ ൌ ͷͲ, ߪ௧௝ ൌ ʹͲ, 
ݏଵǡ௝ ൌ ͳͲͲͲͲ, ݏଶǡ௝ǡ ݏଷǡ௝ ൌ ʹͲͲͲͲ and ݏସǡ௝ǡ ݏହǡ௝ ൌ ͷͲͲͲ. Tables 
1, 2, 3 show the value of parameters which are special to 
product 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
Table 1 Parameters for product 1. 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 
݌௧ଵ 300 300 300 300 300 
݄௧ଵ௥  15 15 30 30 15 
݃௧ଵ 120 120 120 120 120 
ܿ௧ଵ 60 60 60 60 60 
݄௧ଵ௦  20 15 30 15 15 
ݓ௧ଵ 250 250 250 250 250 
 
Table 2 Parameters for product 2. 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 
݌௧ଶ 290 290 290 290 290 
݄௧ଶ௥  15 30 30 15 15 
݃௧ଶ 116 116 116 116 116 
ܿ௧ଶ 50 50 50 50 50 
݄௧ଶ௦  20 15 30 15 15 
ݓ௧ଶ 230 230 230 230 230 
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The computational experiments are performed with the 
parameters in Tables 1, 2, and 3. In the supplier’s problem, the 
initial quantity of the inventory ܫ଴ǡ௝௦ ൌ ͳͷͲǤThey are obtained 
by the optimization in the bilevel programming problem. The 
supplier can produce only one type of product item in each 
period by the constraint (4). Table 4 shows the computational 
results of the order quantity and the production quantity. 
According to the results, the retailer decides larger amount of 
order quantity when the inventory holding cost is lower in order 
to decrease the total inventory holding costs. In the numerical 
experiments, the inventory holding cost is lower than the 
opportunity cost to the retailer. Therefore, the retailer prefers to 
increase the quantity of inventories so as not to increase the 
opportunity loss costs. On the other hand, the supplier can 
produce only one type of items in each period by the constraint 
(4). Therefore, the supplier decides the order quantity in order 
to maximize its total profit. According to the results in Table 4, 
the supplier decides larger amount of products in order to 
decrease the inventory holding costs.  
Table 5 shows the supplier’s and the retailer’s objective 
values. In the Stackelberg equilibrium conditions, the retailer’s 
objective value is negative. Although the negative objective 
value is not realistic, the numerical results are valid because the 
supplier’s objective value becomes the largest at the 
equilibrium point. 
  
 
We conduct the computational experiments when the leader-
follower relationship can be changed dynamically. Then, the 
next three cases are conducted. 
 
Case 1: The supplier is the leader in all periods.  
Case 2: The retailer is the leader in all periods.  
Case 3: The leader is started from the supplier and the leader is 
changed from the supplier to the retailer at the start of period 3. 
  
In the Stackelberg game where the leader is the retailer, the 
retailer’s problem is the upper problem and the supplier 
problem is the lower problem. In this case, the supplier at first 
makes its decision in order to maximize its own profit and then 
the retailer makes decisions with the supplier’s decision 
variable in order to maximize the retailer’s total profit.  
In the Stackelberg game where the leader is changed in 
period 3, the supplier is the leader in periods 1 and 2. The 
supplier makes a decision in order to maximize its own profit 
for whole periods. Then, the leader is changed from the supplier 
to the retailer, and the retailer makes decision as the leader in 
period 3. In this case, the decision variables of the supplier and 
the retailer in periods 1 and 2 are obtained and used in order to 
solve the Stackelberg game where the retailer is the leader in 
period 3, 4 and 5.  
 The computational experiments are performed with the 
parameters in Tables 1, 2, 3 which are the same condition in the 
experiment of the Stackelberg game where the leader is the 
supplier.  
Tables 6, 7, 8 show the computational result of the 
experiments for Case 1, Case 2, Case 3, respectively. 
According to the table, the total profit is the largest if the leader 
is changed from the supplier to the retailer. In the Stackelberg 
game where the supplier is the leader, the supplier’s inventory 
cost is small. On the other hand, the supplier’s setup cost is 
large. In this case, the setup cost is the lowest priority in the 
supplier’s decision making in period 5. Therefore, the supplier 
makes decisions in order to increase the high-priority decision 
variable, for example, the amount of production or inventory. 
Moreover, in the Stackelberg game where the supplier is the 
leader, the retailer makes a decision in order to maximize the 
retailer’s profit. In this case, the retailer makes a decision 
without considering the supplier’s setup cost. Therefore, the 
setup cost cannot be decreased in this situation. 
In the Stackelberg game where the retailer is the leader, the 
retailer makes decisions with the supplier’s decision making 
which is conducted first. In this case, the retailer prefers the 
point where the order quantity is satisfied with the customer’s 
demand. Therefore, the supplier is required to produce in order 
to satisfy the retailer’s order quantity and cannot be considered 
the setup cost. However, the retailer should make decisions 
with the supplier’s decision making. Therefore, the total profit 
is smaller than that in a Stackelberg game where the leader is 
the supplier.   
On the other hand, the setup cost is the smallest in the 
situation where the leader is changed in period 3. In this 
situation, the retailer makes decisions with the supplier’s 
decision making after changing the leader from the supplier to 
the retailer. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Parameters for product 3. 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 
݌௧ଷ 270 270 270 270 270 
݄௧ଷ௥  15 15 15 30 30 
݃௧ଷ 108 108 108 108 108 
ܿ௧ଷ 40 40 40 40 40 
݄௧ଷ௦  15 15 15 30 30 
ݓ௧ଷ 240 240 240 240 240 
Table 4 Computational results of order quantity and 
production quantity. 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 
ܳ௧ଵ 78 49 42 48 22 
ܳ௧ଶ 78 42 49 55 17 
ܳ௧ଷ 76 49 49 42 21 
௧ܱଵ 0 0 90 0 0 
௧ܱଶ 0 19 0 72 0 
௧ܱଷ 87 0 0 0 0 
Table 5 Computational results of the profit for supplier 
and retailer. 
Objective Values 
ܬ௦ 91587 
ܬ௥ ͳ͸ͻͶʹ 
Total 108529 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In this study, the multi-period bilevel supply chain model is 
formulated. In the model, the supplier and the retailer make 
decisions in the Stackelberg game in which the supplier’s 
problem is the upper level, and the retailer’s problem is the 
lower level. In order to compute the equilibrium solution by the 
experimental method, the retailer’s problem is reformulated by 
normalization of the probability distribution which expresses 
the customer’s demand. The solution algorithm is shown in 
order to solve the equilibrium solution in the nonlinear bilevel 
programming problem, and the model’s validity is shown by 
the numerical experiments. Moreover, the comparison with 
some situation, the total profit is the largest in Stackelbeg game 
where the leader is changed from the supplier to the retailer in 
period 3. In the future works, we will develop the solution 
algorithm in order to be applied to more a large scale problem 
and solve the problem in a small computational time. Moreover, 
we will consider better scenarios for a Stackelberg game where 
the leader is changed in some period by some numerical 
experiments. 
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Table 8 Computational results of Case 3 
(the leader is changed at period 3) 
Objective function Supplier Retailer 
Production cost െͳͲǡ͹ͷͲ  
Inventory holding cost െͳʹǡͳʹͲ െͷǡ͵ͺͲ 
Setup cost െ͵ͷǡͲͲͲ  
Opportunity loss cost  െͳͲǡ͵ʹʹ 
Wholesale cost 161,133 െͳ͸ͳǡͳ͵͵ 
Revenue  201,328 
Total profit 103,263 12,360 
Table 9 Comparison of performance in each case 
leader setup cost ܬ௦ ܬ௥ Total  
supplier 55,000 91,587 16,943 108,530 
retailer 55,000 91,457 16,904 108,361 
change 35,000 103,263 12,360 115,623 
Table 6 Computational results of Case 1 
(the leader is the supplier) 
Objective function Supplier Retailer 
Production cost െͳ͵ǡͶͶ͵  
Inventory holding cost െͳʹǡ͵͵ͺ െ͸ǡͷͶͺ 
Setup cos െͷͷǡͲͲͲ  
Opportunity loss cost  െͷǡͶ͸ͻ 
Wholesale cost 172,368 െͳ͹ʹǡ͵͸ͺ 
Revenue  201,328 
Total profit 91,587 16,942 
 
Table 7 Computational results of Case 2 
(the leader is the retailer) 
Objective function Supplier Retailer 
Production cost െͳ͵ǡͶ͵ͻ  
Inventory holding cost െͳʹǡͶͷ͹ െ͸ǡͷ͹ͺ 
Setup cost െͷͷǡͲͲͲ  
Opportunity loss cost  െͷǡͶ͹͸ 
Wholesale cost 172,353 െͳ͹ʹǡ͵ͷ͵ 
Revenue  201,310 
Total profit 91,457 16,904 
 
